Measuring and Mitigating Adversarial Intermediaries on the Global Internet

Hybrid Event: 3725 BBB / Zoom

Abstract: Over the past decade, significant shifts in the threat landscape have positioned network infrastructure itself as a potential adversary. Rapid advances and commoditization of networking technologies such as Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), combined with loosened regulations like the repeal of net neutrality, have granted the network with unprecedented capability and freedom to inspect, modify, throttle, or even hijacks the traffic it transports at fine granularity and line rate. What were once neutral “dumb pipes” have evolved into capable and sometimes adversarial network intermediaries—ranging from malicious middleboxes and rogue ISPs to compromised routers and untrusted transit networks—all creating new threats that increasingly erode user privacy, autonomy, and overall trust in connectivity.

In this talk, I will present my research on measuring, characterizing, and mitigating threats posed by these adversarial network intermediaries. I first describe novel methodologies and large-scale empirical measurements that reveal how prevalent and intrusive these intermediaries have become on the global Internet. Next, I discuss my work on principled approaches to network traffic obfuscation, evaluating existing obfuscations in real-world scenarios and proposing novel frameworks for creating principled obfuscations that provide lasting resistance against traffic analysis.